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A global crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic that started in early 2020
poses significant challenges for how research is conducted and
communicated. We present four case studies from the perspective of an
interdisciplinary research institution that switched to “corona-mode” during
the first two months of the crisis, focussing all its capacities on
COVID-19-related issues, communicating to the public directly and via
media, as well as actively advising the national government. The case
studies highlight the challenges posed by the increased time pressure,
high demand for transparency, and communication of complexity and
uncertainty. The article gives insights into how these challenges were
addressed in our research institution and how science communication in
general can be managed during a crisis.
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Introduction How will the number of infections with the novel SARS-CoV-2 virus develop and
when will the maximum capacity of the healthcare system be reached? How is the
population reacting to governmental countermeasures to curb the spread of the
virus? Which regions have an increased risk of infections? These are only some of
the questions that researchers were asked to answer during the currently ongoing
COVID-19 pandemic.
In this practice insight, we present four case studies exemplifying the
communication of SARS-CoV-2-related research to policymakers, media and the
public. The research was conducted at the Complexity Science Hub Vienna (CSH),
a research institution actively engaged in advising the Austrian government as part
of a scientific advisory board during the COVID-19 pandemic. Researchers at the
CSH link state-of-the-art mathematics, modelling, data and computer science with
fundamental questions in various disciplines, such as medicine, economics,
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ecology, or social sciences. At the onset of the pandemic in Austria around 14
March, day-to-day research was halted and the CSH switched to “corona-mode”,
directing all research activities to answer questions such as the ones posed above.
The challenges that arose from the special circumstances of the ongoing pandemic
included (i) sharply increased time pressure and communication frequency, (ii) the
need for increased transparency under the restrictions of data protection and
confidentiality, and (iii) the increased need to communicate complex information,
such as statistical uncertainties, while also offering “easy-to-follow” practical
advice. We thereby take into account the reception of our research results from the
perspective of policymakers as well as the media and the general public. We also
discuss the design considerations and tradeoffs regarding the visual aspects of our
communication.
Time pressure
Many crises that feature significant direct involvement of researchers to solve
imminent problems are one-off events like earthquakes, where the “critical period”
[Stein, 2004] of the disaster is too short for researchers to engage. Researchers are
only involved to help alleviate consequences after the event has happened or to
predict future events. On the other end of the spectrum are long-lasting issues such
as the HIV-AIDS epidemic or the climate crisis, where the critical period lasts for
years. In both scenarios, there is no excessive time pressure on researchers. In
contrast, during a pandemic, circumstances can change within days and decisions
have to be made quickly to take action and prevent further harm. In this regard, a
pandemic is similar to events such as volcanic eruptions [Haynes, Barclay and
Pidgeon, 2008], oil spills [Lubchenco et al., 2012; McNutt, 2020], and nuclear
catastrophes [Shore, 2013], which require immediate intervention, leading to
intense time pressure on all involved actors.
Transparency in the context of public attention and confidentiality
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the researchers “on the frontline” were asked to
participate in the publication cycle of broad media outlets to a far greater extent
than before the crisis. As a consequence, the CSH’s science communication rapidly
changed from a “science push” scenario to a “policy (and media) pull” scenario
[Bielak et al., 2008; Marcinkowski and Kohring, 2014]. While the CSH continued to
publish (push) new results on a webpage dedicated to COVID-19-related research
[Complexity Science Hub Vienna, 2020b], direct requests from the media to
comment on current developments, as well as direct requests for information from
policymakers (pull), sharply increased. There was also a new and intense interest
in the scientific process itself, including broad media reporting about preprints and
scientific disputes. This phenomenon of mass media reporting on communications
that are usually intended only for expert audiences could be witnessed on a global
scale; for instance, the discussion in the U.K. of the simulation of case number
predictions [Boland and Zolfagharifard, 2020] and a discussion in Germany on the
viral load of children [Bild, 2020]. As a result of the increased exposure, the origin
of information sources used in our research, such as anonymized mobile phone
localization records, was critically questioned by the media, and transparency was
demanded. On the other hand, confidentiality for parts of our results and
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information sources was required, for reasons of national security as well as data
protection.
Communicating complex information and uncertainty
The scientific process at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic was characterised by
a high degree of unknowable uncertainty [Chua Chow and Sarin, 2002] in relation
to the assessment of risk and future development of the pandemic. This included
the biological parameters of the virus and the associated disease as well as the most
effective strategy to curb its spread. Due to test shortages, the spread of the virus
was also poorly understood. In this context, science had to be communicated while
emphasizing the uncertainty involved in the issue [Fischhoff, 2012]. Policymakers
needed to be aware of the uncertainties when making hard choices under time
pressure [Renn, 2010]. The complexity of the information provided and the
uncertainty involved thus made it challenging to satisfy the general demand for
practical advice.
We chose the following case studies to exemplify the aforementioned challenges
and describe the strategies we used to overcome them.
(I) Predicting case
numbers:
communication
under time
pressure
During the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in Europe in mid-February to early
March 2020, it was not entirely clear to which extent the public − but also
policymakers − understood the gravity of the situation. Observing the early
epidemic growth pattern in Austria for two to three weeks showed that the
increase of the number of confirmed cases could be reasonably approximated by
exponential growth, as is often observed for uncontrolled outbreaks of infectious
diseases [Anderson and May, 1992]. Initially, we observed a doubling time of
around 2.3 days. This fact, together with the assumption that any kind of
non-pharmaceutical intervention to curb the spread of the disease would have an
effect with a time delay of one to two weeks, meant that decisions to implement
interventions needed to be taken proactively. While data on infection numbers was
publicly available [Austrian Federal Ministry for Health, 2020a] it was not clear
how many intensive care beds were available for the treatment of severe and
critical COVID patients. To obtain this number, we parsed data from an online
resource for hospital bed numbers and their average occupancy from the Ministry
of Health [Austrian Federal Ministry for Health, 2020b]. Extrapolating the
observed exponential trend and using available estimates for hospitalization
probabilities [Wang et al., 2020] allowed for a back-of-the-envelope calculation of
the point in time at which the pandemic would overwhelm hospital capacities.
To convey the urgency of the situation, we depicted the projection of hospitalized
case numbers based on historic cases on a standard line plot (see Figure 1). By
including “thresholds” of available beds, the graph thus also illustrated the
capacity of the healthcare system, how much of this capacity remained, and when
the thresholds of available hospital beds would be crossed.
Given our assumptions, there were three main sources for uncertainty, namely the
(i) observed growth rate, (ii) available beds, and (iii) probability of hospitalization.
Under exponential growth, even errors of a factor of two in the case numbers
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Figure 1. Initial communication about the projection of case numbers and ICU capacity in
Austria. The graph shows an estimate of the hospitalized infections based on historic case
numbers of the last two weeks at that time (blue dots) and a prediction of hospitalized case
numbers for the coming month (brown line). Horizontal dashed lines indicate the number
of available hospital beds.
would only slightly shift the day on which the capacity threshold was reached and
would not alter our main findings. We therefore decided not to illustrate this
uncertainty for the sake of clarity, but we discuss this limitation in the text. What
remains is the structural uncertainty concerning the assumption of constant
exponential growth. We decided to monitor the growth pattern daily and
immediately report deviations from this assumption.
We made this prediction for Austria within about two days, allowing the time to
publish a short text and a simple graph (see Figure 1) on Twitter and in a policy
brief [Complexity Science Hub Vienna, 2020a] as a press release. We aimed to alert
the public to the imminent crisis and urge policymakers to take steps. Good
relations with Austrian science desks helped to successfully disseminate our
results.
As decision-makers noticed this initial communication, they invited the CSH to
participate in an interdisciplinary team of scientists and decision-makers.
Decision-makers expected mid- to long-term (a couple of months) predictions on
infection numbers. It took a mutual learning process to help them understand that
the expected confidence intervals (i.e., uncertainty) were crucial to showing the
limits of this type of prediction of non-linear processes. We were successful in
communicating to policymakers that only the “when”, not the “if ” of our prediction
was uncertain: healthcare capacity would be exceeded eventually if no measures
were taken and exponential growth of cases of infection continued. An additional
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challenge in this process was that various teams of researchers contributed to
predictions at this point, with different approaches to the prediction of case
numbers and the estimation of confidence intervals. As a result, policymakers
consolidated these approaches to arrive at short-term predictions (over a time
horizon of 7–10 days), which were then communicated to the public [Austrian
Federal Ministry for Social Affairs, 2020].
The figures, numbers, and predictions about COVID-19 cases in Austria and daily
updates on our webpage were disseminated by the media without questioning our
results or methods. Nevertheless, we successfully conveyed the uncertainty of our
results to media outlets: some outlets communicated the assumptions underlying
the prediction (continued exponential growth) [APA, 2020a] while others reported
the confidence intervals for the point in time at which hospital capacity would be
reached [Österreichischer Rundfunk, 2020a]. All reports communicated that the
point in time at which the healthcare capacity would be exceeded was an
approximate and not an exact prediction.
Due to the rapid pace of developments and communication at the beginning of the
pandemic, scientists, as well as journalists, were in danger of producing inaccurate
or not well-founded information. The CSH did not become involved in a
controversy about forecasting methods around the end of April, when an
unpublished mathematical paper predicted horrendous numbers of possible cases
in the near future [Hermisson et al., 2020; Metzger, 2020]. The numbers were used
by the Austrian Chancellor in a press conference [Bischof, 2020] that later was
labelled as spreading unnecessary panic [Der Standard, 2020b; Österreichischer
Rundfunk, 2020c]. This situation highlighted the need for internal quality control
before publication, which was amplified by the real danger of causing panic when
disseminating results in a misleading way.
(II) Measure
effectiveness:
between
transparency and
data protection
To curb the spread of the virus and slow down the exponential growth in the
number of infections that was showcased in the first case study, the Austrian
government implemented countermeasures. An extensive lockdown was imposed,
starting on 16 March, allowing only four reasons to leave the house: work, if not
suspensible, shopping for food and other essential goods, assisting people in need,
and taking short walks. Subsequently, decision-makers were interested in the level
of adherence to the lockdown rules to determine whether even stricter measures, as
imposed e.g. in Spain or northern Italy, would be necessary.
To answer this question, we measured the reduction of population movement
(radius of gyration [Gauvin et al., 2020]) based on mobile phone localization data
[Heiler and Reisch, 2020c; Heiler and Reisch, 2020a; Heiler and Reisch, 2020b;
Heiler, Reisch et al., 2020] (see Figure 2) and the reduction of the number of
passengers passing through metro stations in Vienna (see Figure 3). The emphasis
was on showcasing the dramatic change in mobility and on quantifying said
reduction. An additional aim of our communication was to share information about
the change in movement patterns with the public, which was previously provided
only to the government by other parties [Bechtold, Prenner and Dax, 2020]. We
continued to update the plots regularly throughout the pandemic, especially
monitoring the changes around Easter and 1 May, when the first easing of the
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Figure 2. Relative difference in movement range between March 2nd and March 16th.
lockdown measures took place. By now, similar data about movement patterns is
publicly available for many different countries [Apple, 2020; Google, 2020].
Figure 3. Relative load of passengers in the Vienna subway, listed per stop, over time
between March 1st and March 24th.
In the first days, the CSH missed the opportunity to communicate clearly that it
was never in possession of the raw mobile phone localization data and analysed
only aggregates. This became an issue when an Austrian media outlet asked for
data access to create its own visualizations. When we declared that we could not
provide data (instead of stating that we did not have it), the media outlet
commented negatively on the refusal, claiming that the CSH would do “movement
data analyses” “for the federal government” only, but would not share this
information with the public [Addendum, 2020].
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The visualizations published by the CSH quantify how mobility has decreased
as an effect of the lockdown, in terms of when (the temporal development), where
(geographic variability), and how much of the population adhered to the imposed
restrictions. When restricted to static/non-interactive images, there is a tradeoff as
to which parts of this information to convey. In Figure 2, information is temporally
aggregated to show the relative difference between movement ranges between two
calendar weeks in the map’s colour channel. Figure 3 displays the relative change
in the passenger load in the Vienna subway system over time. Subway stops
(inherently spatial information) are thereby abstracted to individual lines in the plot.
(III) “Corona Traffic
Light”: the
complexity of
simple
communication
From the perspective of healthcare professionals and policymakers, a timely and
regional epidemiological risk assessment tool was essential for an appropriate
response during the ongoing pandemic. Depending on the regional severity and
underlying trends, primary care organizations adopted different modes of risk
management. Many public dashboards showing the global spread of the infection
at the time (see for example [John Hopkins University, 2020] ) only conveyed
absolute case numbers, while not taking other healthcare-related aspects, such as
the availability of doctors in a region, into account. To accurately judge the severity
of the situation across regions, knowledge about relative regional case numbers
was required. To satisfy this requirement, in mid-April, we developed the “Corona
Traffic Light” as a visual tool for risk communication, which we published on our
webpage for Austria and the world [Sprenger et al., 2020b; Sprenger et al., 2020a].
It allows the current regional epidemiological situation in Austria to be
communicated to healthcare professionals, policymakers, and the general public,
facilitating the establishment of local measures.
We used a commonly understood visual metaphor, i.e. the “traffic light” system
with three colours, to make the visualization easier to grasp [Ziemkiewicz and
Kosara, 2008]. We chose the number of SARS-CoV-2-positive tested cases in the last
14 days (conforming to one incubation period [Lauer et al., 2020] ) per 10,000
citizens as the unit of measurement for describing the regional situation. A green
region conveys that normal life, without (severe) restrictions, is possible. On the
other end of the spectrum, the colour red conveys a high regional infection risk.
Cut-off values between the three levels needed to be chosen carefully to avoid
creating a false sense of safety if a region was coloured green, or panic if a region
turned yellow. Based on the feedback of healthcare practitioners, we defined the
cut-off value for the red level as more than 10 SARS-CoV-2 positive tested cases in
the last 14 days per 10,000 citizens. In such regions, severe measures are mandated
to reduce the reproduction number of the virus. A region is yellow if there are
between one and ten positively tested persons per 10,000 citizens. In these areas,
measures should be taken according to the trend of the infection rate, that is, light
or severe measures when the rate is decreasing or increasing, respectively. The
trend of the regional temporal development can be queried interactively by the
user (see Figure 4 d).
While the thresholds for the traffic light colours were curated by healthcare experts,
the tool did not explicitly answer questions such as “How safe is a green zone?”,
“How dangerous is a red zone?”, or “Which kind of countermeasures are
appropriate/necessary for each colour?” Such guidelines needed to be developed
by healthcare professionals and policymakers, such that the “Corona Traffic Light”
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Figure 4. Overview of the Corna Traffic Light interface. (a) The map is displayed on the res-
olution of political districts, colored according to the current risk-level. Levels are described
on a legend (b): green = less than one positively tested person across 10.000 citizens, yellow
= less than ten positively tested, red = more than ten. The time-slider (c) enables a historic
perspective of the situation within the last 30 days. By hovering on a district with the mouse-
pointer, the local trend of the pandemic can be assessed (d). Additional regional information,
such as the number of citizens in risk groups, can be accessed by clicking on a district (e).
can be used as a basis for decisions on the implementation of measures during
possible recurring waves of infections.
We featured the Corona Traffic Light on the CSH webpage and through a press
release, social media, and personal contacts to journalists. Its catchy name likely
helped in the dissemination process: it was immediately picked up by the mass
media and became the most used tool on the CSH webpage, and click rates
remained high despite decreasing infection numbers.
Healthcare professionals reacted very positively to the visualization. Some health
centres started to develop status reports for their patients based on the tool, which
were placed prominently in the entrance area. Similar to a weather forecast, they
informed patients about the current regional and nationwide situation and the
necessary regional preventive measures regarding hygiene, patient management
and usage of protective equipment.
A chapter of the Austrian Economic Chambers considered using the tool to decide
which borders to neighbouring countries could be opened. Between green regions,
there was no reason to restrict travel. However, for this to work, the tool would
have to be coordinated and curated on a European scale. In addition, not all
policymakers were enthusiastic about the Corona Traffic Light. Some raised
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concerns that it “punished” regions that were testing the most, as these regions
would detect more cases and appear less secure as a consequence. This was an
unintended consequence of our tool.
Similar traffic-light-inspired tools for risk assessment have also surfaced in other
countries [Berlin.de, 2020; risklayer, 2020]. While such tools can be purely
descriptive, i.e. without assigning specific risk levels to thresholds [risklayer, 2020],
the Senate of Berlin used the traffic-light system to determine the necessity of
countermeasures [Berlin.de, 2020]. However, the reaction and critique from the
media and the public [rbb24, 2020], including attempts to reverse-engineer the
Senate’s metrics due to a lack of transparency, illustrate the importance of clear
communication regarding data sources and the calculation of risk factors. In July
2020, the Austrian government announced a government-regulated Corona Traffic
Light for risk management during a potential second wave in autumn [APA, 2020b;
Gaigg and Müller, 2020].
(IV) Social media
and emotions:
between nuanced
scientific
approaches and
practical advice
As the countermeasures implemented constituted an immense interference into the
living conditions and fundamental rights of the Austrian population, researchers at
the CSH quickly became interested in assessing the sentiment of the population. In
the early weeks of the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak, we published several reports about
the evolution of emotional and social expressions on Twitter in 2020 in different
countries, including Austria (see Figure 5) [Metzler, Rimé and Garcia, 2020]. Next,
we built an online emotion monitor that was automatically updated daily [Pellert
et al., 2020] based on text data from Twitter, the online discussion forum of a major
Austrian newspaper, and a chat platform for young adults. In the initial reports on
the CSH website, we focused on increases in expressions of anxiety (the most
relevant collective emotion in response to a threat) and prosocial attitudes (a
positive aspect of the public response). In these reports, we also included
recommendations for psychological health and links to reliable information sources
about SARS-CoV2. We further investigated changes in anger, sadness, positive
emotions, and social terms such as “family” or “help”, and presented these results
via the online monitor, interviews with journalists, and presentations to
policymakers.
The most difficult tradeoff in visualizing emotion timelines concerned the
advantages and disadvantages of showing absolute compared to relative
percentage values of emotional expressions. Showing absolute values, on the one
hand, helps to accurately interpret the extent of a change in relation to the base rate,
but does not allow comparison between different countries and languages, which
readers intuitively make nonetheless. Relative percentages, on the other hand,
account for irrelevant differences in the baseline levels and thus allow comparisons,
but easily lead to overestimating the importance of a change if the base rate is low.
Eventually, we chose relative percentages to prevent misinterpretations of
differences in baselines that depended only on small differences in the emotion
measures for different languages. To allow readers to interactively explore the
figures in the online reports and monitor (zoom, look at specific dates or values),
we compiled figures with the R package Plotly [Plotly Technologies Inc., 2015].
We sent a short description of our social media analysis to all CSH press contacts,
informed the Austrian Press Agency (science desk) in a personal telephone call,
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Figure 5. Changes in the percentage of tweets containing at least one emotional or social
term on Twitter compared to the baseline in Austria. A value of zero corresponds to the
average level per weekday in 2019 (baseline). We believe that the marked decline in anger
during the time of lockdown in Austria is caused by the reduction of words referring to viol-
ent incidents, such as robberies or demonstrations and the shift of public discourse towards
corona related topics [Pellert et al., 2020]. This is also supported by reports of drastically
decreased criminality in Austria during the lockdown [Weichhart, 2020].
and shared some results via Twitter and Facebook. We did not publish these
reports for a specific purpose other than allowing the public to reflect on their own
emotional experiences. Nevertheless, they quickly caught the attention of
policymakers looking for advice regarding measures against the outbreak.
Participating in the COVID-19 Future Operations Clearing Board (an
interdisciplinary platform for exchange between researchers and politicians
initiated by the Austrian Federal Chancellery), we realized that social media
analyses may satisfy policymakers’ need for up-to-date results, but cannot provide
direct recommendations for political decisions. As politicians focused on
recommendations and direct answers to questions about the degree of acceptance
or psychological consequences of measures, we realized the importance of
communicating the limited conclusions that a particular analysis allows.
Our results were featured by the Austrian Press Agency, and consequently in
several online newspapers, including Der Standard, Science.ORF.at, and Wiener
Zeitung [Der Standard, 2020a; Österreichischer Rundfunk, 2020b; Wiener Zeitung
Online, 2020]. Early reports by science journalists demonstrated that we had
successfully communicated a nuanced interpretation of our results, including
potential misunderstandings. Later media requests were mostly interested in
people’s opinions about the measures, exciting novel results or results that
confirmed journalists’ expectations. We insisted on cautious interpretations and
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actual empirical evidence by emphasizing, for instance, that our results capture
only emotional expressions, not emotions themselves, or by clarifying that
expressions of anger remained below the baseline for three months in a row after
the onset of the pandemic, despite increasing criticism of measures in the media.
As a result, these later interviews (e.g. with Puls 4, Die Presse, Focus) were never
published. This highlights a real tradeoff between capturing the attention of the
media and the public and achieving an accurate and nuanced presentation of
scientific results.
Lessons learned
from
communicating
science in times of
crisis
In the following, we discuss strategies on how to deal with the three challenges that
we defined in the course of this paper: time pressure, transparency, and
communicating complex information, and that were illustrated in our case studies.
A brief summary of the insights described in this article in the form of practical
guidelines can be found as a supplementary text.
Dealing with time pressure
One way to tackle the increased time pressure of the short cycles between
receiving, evaluating, and presenting insights gained from new information is to
break down scientific questions and results into smaller units, or to establish
continuous reporting outlets in the form of monitors. This strategy is especially
feasible when monitoring and communicating daily changes, such as case numbers
[Sprenger et al., 2020b], movement patterns [Complexity Science Hub Vienna,
2020b] and population sentiment [Pellert et al., 2020] to inform decision-makers
and the public in real time.
In these cases, communication and dissemination are facilitated and become more
effective, i.e. better received and understood, if message content and format adhere
to common standards [Ziemkiewicz and Kosara, 2008]. Governmental agencies
such as the CDC in the U.S.A. have developed crisis-communication strategies for
catastrophic events [Dalrymple, Young and Tully, 2016; Reynolds and Quinn, 2008;
Reynolds and Seeger, 2005]. Like these agencies, research institutions should
become aware of the potential impact of their area of expertise in times of crisis and
develop crisis-communication strategies accordingly. They should be prepared to
quickly transition from a “science push” to a “policy pull” [Bielak et al., 2008] mode
of communication in times of crisis and have a clear plan for communication
responsibilities and workflow. Implementing such a plan also has the potential to
lower the time spent on coordinating the communication. The plan should also
include the legal aspects of handling sensitive data such as patient health records
or mobile phone data. Clarifying these aspects during a crisis takes significant
amounts of time and severely hampers communication.
Next to a “crisis strategy”, another remedy to produce correct results with fewer
means for quality control is to involve as many colleagues as possible in the
scientific and modelling process to mimic an informal “review process” under
stress. A necessary means for this is more efficient internal communication. During
“corona-mode” at the CSH, the use of a central communication platform (Slack)
was enforced, which facilitated sharing and discussing information in an internally
transparent way. At the same time, daily group calls offered the possibility to ask
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peers for internal review and proofreading of results and methods and to spot the
potential for misunderstandings of the communication.
Such quality checks could also be made transparent to decision-makers and the pub-
lic to foster trust. Nevertheless, the reduced time for debate most certainly results
in lower-quality output, and the risk that scientists lose their most valuable good —
reputation — is high. By employing the highest standards of transparency and
proactive communication of uncertainties, this risk can be minimized to some extent.
Managing transparency
Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, we perceived an increased interest of the
public in the scientific process. The crisis has shown that transparency of the
scientific process is increasingly being demanded by the public and is needed to
quickly share and discuss results and methods among experts and policymakers.
Communicating the entire scientific process, including the context as well as the
methods and data used for research, is becoming increasingly important in
communication to non-experts as well.
Surveys conducted during the crisis show a sharp increase of trust in science and
scientists [Carrell, 2020; Wissenschaft im Dialog, 2020], which also results in
acceptance and adoption of protective measures [Dohle, Wingen and Schreiber,
2020]. This is in line with previous reports of the perception of scientists as a
trustworthy source of information during a crisis [Haynes, Barclay and Pidgeon,
2008]. Therefore, next to the challenges, the COVID-19 pandemic also offers the
unique opportunity to strengthen the role of science in public discussions and
future policy decisions through proactive and transparent communication and to
inform the public about the scientific process.
However, if results are still in the making, if solid conclusions are not yet possible,
or if the refereeing process is not yet completed, the question of how scientists
should communicate transparently remains open. Should scientists discuss their
doubts openly in public − risking stress from public exposure − or should they
involve only decision-makers in the discussion?
For the COVID-19 pandemic, there is evidence that the presence of corrective
information helps to debunk misinformation [van der Meer and Jin, 2020] and to
increase compliance with measures [Hameleers, van der Meer and Brosius, 2020].
This indicates that the public should be transparently informed about the current
state of affairs and be involved in the ongoing discussion of policy decisions, and
can be trusted to act cooperatively and intelligently. Still, both
approaches — complete transparency and holding back results until they have
been subject to rigorous quality checks — are valid in certain circumstances and
need to be balanced in crisis communication.
To strike this balance in practice, we established an internal review system to
ensure results were checked by several researchers before they were communicated
to the public. Additionally, we aimed to publish the data, methods and source code
underlying our results wherever legally possible.
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In the current COVID-19 pandemic, both policymakers and scientists had access to
the relevant information and engaged in communication with the public. In our
experience, policymakers tend to resort to streamlined communication that
emphasizes confidentiality and is designed to persuade the population to comply
with measures. This leaves the role of the “transparency creators” to the scientists,
who must balance the political communication in times of crisis. While this comes
with a high additional time cost and a potential risk to reputation, we think it is the
responsibility of scientists to take this role and to proactively publish the maximum
possible amount of information to create transparency wherever legally possible −
as we did with our analysis of movement patterns during the crisis.
In the context of Open Science, publishing preliminary results in the form of
preprints, data and methods has gained considerable traction in the scientific
community during the last years in the interests of fostering research
reproducibility and integrity [Fidler and Wilcox, 2018; Munafò, 2016]. During times
of crisis, Open Science practices create transparency and can help improve trust. To
this end, adopting Open Science workflows in everyday scientific work facilitates
transparent communication in times of crisis and lowers the additional strain on
limited time resources incurred by getting used to new practices during times of
crisis. Here, an important aspect is also a clear description of the exact nature and
source of data sets that are used — especially when sensible data sets are analysed.
To this end, we included extensive information about data sources and data
processing in the disclaimers accompanying both the Corona Traffic Light and the
emotion monitor.
Communicating complex information
When communicating scientific results or processes, the message has to be tailored
to the target audience — this holds true for visual as well as verbal communication.
This curation of a message concerns not only the degree of detail and complexity
conveyed, but also the tone of the message.
Extreme and careless reporting has the potential to incite fear and can be used by
the tabloid press to create the impression of chaos and incompetence [Bild, 2020],
which no scientist wants to be associated with. This also places additional strain on
the researcher’s time to clarify misunderstandings and debunk false results. Still,
the hypothesis of “disaster panic”, which assumes that in emergencies people will
give in to mass hysteria, has been disproven by disaster experts in the last decades
[Gantt and Gantt, 2012; Auf der Heide, 2004; Sandman and Lanard, 2005].
Historical evidence also points to groundswells of organized and prosocial
behaviour during and after disasters [Bernardini and Hart, 2011; Fritz and
Williams, 1957; Grimm et al., 2014; Zaki, 2020]. This strengthens our conviction to
be transparent and trust the public with information, even if it is uncomfortable.
Nevertheless, researchers should never compromise on the communication of
uncertainty — even when the demand for simple answers and clear advice is high,
as was the case for the prediction of case numbers and the monitoring of public
sentiment.
While visual communication can help to foster the dissemination of research results
in a way that is easy to understand intuitively, careless design decisions can have
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the opposite effect. If counter-intuitive encodings are chosen or if the information is
presented in a way that is too complex for the target audience to grasp, results can
be misinterpreted. It is therefore important to double-check whether the intended
message was received, which is challenging under time pressure. In the case of the
emotion monitor, we tried to predict possible sources of misunderstanding by the
users beforehand and carefully chose the visualizations accordingly. The Corona
Traffic Light was shown to several healthcare practitioners to aid with streamlining
metrics and representation before going public.
Another aspect to consider is the tradeoff between the simplicity of a message and
its completeness. An oversimplified presentation could be prone to false
interpretation due to missing information, while a presentation overloaded with
details can be overwhelming even for expert audiences. In the case of the Corona
Traffic Light, the colours send a clear message thanks to the familiar metaphor.
However, the way the data was aggregated was confusing for some users. The
temporal aggregation over two weeks was perceived as arbitrary by some,
although it was based on the maximal incubation period of the virus. The use of
fractions (one case per 10,000 inhabitants) was confusing when representing less
than one inhabitant. This shows how important it is to keep the information simple
if it is targeted at a broader public. Conversely, simplification always poses the risk
of omitting relevant information: the omission of testing rates in a region allowed
for misinterpretation of infection risk based solely on infection numbers.
The tradeoff between simplicity and completeness can also be remedied by giving
users dynamic control over the visualization if it is hosted in an interactive
format — as was the case for the Corona Traffic Light and the emotion monitor.
Interactive elements can include, for example, different threshold specifications, or
changing the temporal aggregation window and the information included in the
display.
Another challenge is the visual communication of uncertainty, which can make an
already complex message less clear and less understandable. “As little as possible,
as much as necessary” [Ware, 2019] is the guideline here, but it is not always
straightforward to follow. Another way to deal with this tradeoff is to provide
multiple static representations, conveying the same topic with increasing
complexity. Similar to an interactive website representation, interested audiences
thus can delve deeper into a topic, to a level that matches their interest and/or
expertise.
Trust and transparency can also be an issue in visual communication, even if a
visualization conveys only raw data (where does the data come from?), but
especially when the displayed results stem from data transformations (how were
the results calculated?). In such cases, it is essential to reference sources and
methods in accordance with the Open Science spirit. This is why we included
extensive disclaimers in our reporting of movement patterns and public sentiment
and the Corona Traffic Light.
The research-related aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic illustrated in our case
studies (case number prediction, assessment of measure effectiveness, visualization
of infection risk and investigation of public sentiment) are not specific to Austria, as
similar research efforts are currently being undertaken in many countries around
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the world. Therefore, while the case studies presented in this publication are, in
their concrete application, specific to Austria, we believe that the insights into
science communication during a time of crisis can be generalized to other countries
and settings. To this end, we have compiled a short practical guide [Lasser, 2020]
based on what we have learned as well as a compilation of all relevant references
and online resources pertaining to the four case studies (see supplemental
material), in the hope that it can facilitate the preparedness of other research
institutions for a crisis.
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